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The post-graduate studies programme of the University of Athens included 
topics pertinent to artificial fertilization during the academic year 1992-1993 
under the supervision of Professor George Koumandos, Thanassis Papachristos 
and myself, just appointed lecturer at the time. 
Twenty two (22) years after teaching the subject and, most importantly, 
thirteen (13) years after the passing of Law 3089, the focus of interest concerning 
medically assisted reproduction has shifted, in my opinion, primarily towards 
sociology issues and mainly issues related to international private law. 
I shall endeavour a brief appraisal of two most disputed institutions in practice, 
namely post-mortem fertilization and gestational surrogacy. 
Ι. In what concerns post-mortem artificial fertilization there exist, to the best of 
my knowledge, two court decisions, published in legal journals. 
The first case went to court as a case of non-contentious jurisdiction1, when the 
widow of a deceased man asked within the time period provided for by the law 
(six months after her husband’s death but within two years since the time of 
death) that she be granted permission to use her husband’s sperm cryopreserved 
when he was alive so that she could have a child after his death. 
The court ruled that the requirements necessary for the realisation of post-
mortem fertilization applied, even though, as it came out from the specific 
                                                          
1 Athens Court of First Instance 5146/2007 Efarmoges Astikou Dikeou 2010, 940. 
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rationale following the court judgement, the consent of the man for a post-mortem 
artificial fertilization had been granted in his holographic will, which was 
published after his death. 
However, in accordance with the due criticism the above court decision2 was 
faced with, the desire of the testator to have his cryopreserved sperm used, which 
was expressed in his hand-written will and testament, does not meet pertinent 
legal requirements concerning the form of consent necessary for  post-mortem 
artificial fertilization (1457, section 1b CC). 
The court misapplied provision 1457, section 1bCC in conjunction with the 
later provision 7 of Law 3305/2005 and was simply based on the fact that it 
suffices for married couples to give consent for cryopreservation via a private 
document. That is, it overlooked that different kinds of consent are required for 
the general execution of artificial fertilization, the cryopreservation of 
reproductive material and the realization of post-mortem fertilization respectively. 
In addition, it cannot be put forward as an argument that Law 3305 modified the 
provision of Civil Code that defines the type of consent required on every separate 
occasion. Since the required consent specific to post mortem fertilization provided 
for under article 1457 CC was not in compliance with the type specifically 
dictated for it (public notarial), the legal requirements provided for were not met 
and permission should not have been granted to begin with. In fact it turns out that 
the court itself was aware of that fact (that the right type of consent required did 
not apply) and this is why it tried to make up for the lack of legal formality with 
the help of CC provision 178, including in the decision rationale that the will is 
not in contravention of commonly accepted principles of morality! 
I think that the above effort on the part of the court need not even be 
commented upon (although it has been, dully, criticised)3. 
On the whole, suffice it to think that consent to p.m artificial fertilization 
constitutes a legal act and the provisions concerning the legal formality of legal 
acts are jus cogens and cannot be circumvented, even with a private agreement; it 
would be enough to extrapolate the rationale of the decision to a legal act under 
property law, that is to presume that in a holographic will there is a proposition for 
                                                          
2 Trokanas, Efarmoges Astikou Dikeou 2010, 941 et seq. 
3 Trokanas, op cit, p 943. 
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a sale and a transfer of property. Based on what the above court decision takes for 
granted, it would be enough for the buyer to appear before the notary, accept and 
transfer!  
Finally, one cannot resist the temptation to wonder, since the testator had 
been in such a good condition as to voluntarily donate his sperm for 
cryopreservation,  why he did not give his consent for the post mortem artificial 
fertilization through a will drawn up by  a notary public and instead he chose to 
write his own will in hand. Of course one could argue that he may as well have 
been unaware of the need to grant his consent via a notary. Such an argument 
would be more convincing and fall upon more sympathetic ears (ineffectual 
though it still would be in my opinion) compared to the argument claiming that 
the hand-written will and testament does not contravene morality principles. 
According to law, both post mortem fertilization and the use of gestational 
surrogacy are methods which are to be applied subject to strict conditions. The 
civil code provisions concerning legal formality also constitute jus strictum. Any 
effort to interpret with leniency, with the aim of facilitating the signing of a 
contract etc, or any replacement of legal requirements is not permitted. 
The following commented court decision is not directly related to post 
mortem artificial fertilization under Greek law but rather the consequences of a 
post mortem fertilization case which took place abroad. In particular, the 
Thessaloniki CoFI4 was called upon to pass judgement on the acceptance of res 
judicata and validity of an alien court decision on an adoption which had been 
made in Russia. According to the factual part of the ruling, a woman adopted in 
Russia 4 children who were born at about the same time to 2 surrogate mothers (2 
twin gestations) making use of her dead son’s sperm, which means that she 
actually adopted her grandchildren. 
Let it be noted that in the factual part of the ruling it is mentioned that the 
grandmother had tried to have the eggs fertilised with her son’s sperm initially 
transferred in her own uterus5. 
The jus judicata of the adoption decision made in Russia was not affirmed by 
                                                          
4 CoFI of Thessaloniki 7013/2013 Efarmoges Astikou Dikeou 2013, 336 commentary by K. 
Pandelidou. 
5 P. 339, column a.  
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the Greek court, on the grounds that the decision of the Russian court is in 
contravention to domestic public order (CC 33) and the petition was therefore 
rejected.  
The decision was greeted with positive comments by my colleague Professor 
Pandelidou6, who specifically analysed the necessary prerequisites for post-
mortem fertilization, the use of a surrogate mother and the practice of adoption. 
Every single category of provisions involved had been breached in the court case 
above.  
13 years after the introduction of law 3089/2002 and in the aftermath of an 
excellent study by Professor Kounougeri- Manoledaki, including an inclusive 
commentary on the above law, it turns out that the method of post mortem 
fertilization is not applied frequently after all, unless there are permission-granting 
court decisions that have escaped our attention or unless they are in fact executed 
in violation of the time limit, i.e the period of 300 days. If the latter holds true, 
then the MAR centres are breaking the law. The same can be said about the 
mother who endeavoured to bear the sperm of her own son in order to have 
grandchildren. In my opinion the afore-mentioned case ought to be audited by the 
MAR Authority. 
 
ΙΙ. Out of all the issues pertinent to the use of gestational surrogacy the most 
interesting one which has emerged in practice, is undoubtedly whether a single 
infertile male may in fact use this method in order to have a child. 
Let it be noted that in theory a single woman who cannot bear a child can 
make use of an artificial fertilization methods (CC 1460), among which 
gestational surrogacy. We do not have exact data concerning the actual number of 
women who use this method. The case that concerned the Greek courts is well 
known. A single infertile man asked and was granted permission by the court to 
use donated sperm, donated eggs and a surrogate mother and as a result he had 2 
little girls7. Trying to officially enter his children in the family registry he was 
faced with the registrar’s query regarding the name of the woman to be registered 
as the mother. The legal Council of the State opined that the gestational surrogate 
                                                          
6 Pandelidou , op cit. 
7 Athens CoFI 2827/2008 Nomiko Vima Hellenic Law Review 2012, 1437. 
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should be registered8. 
Then the father of the children married (perhaps the surrogate mother, it is not 
clear in the decision) and the woman asked to adopt the children of her husband. 
However, because of her age and in view of the progress of the case, the court 
rejected the petition for adoption9. 
 In the meantime the Athens Court of First Instance Public Prosecutor lodged 
an appeal against the decision by which permission was granted to use a surrogate 
mother. The appeal was sustained by the Court10 and eliminated the decision 
made by the Court of First Instance. Therefore the children had a mother, in 
accordance with the general rule concerning the establishment of motherhood, the 
woman used as a surrogate, but they did not have a father (since the paternity of 
the particular man was based on a court decision which was later eliminated as a 
result of the appeal lodged). The progress of this case is not known to me, nor is it 
of interest in the end. However, a significant role is played by whether the 
surrogate was married or not at the time the children were born- I think she was.11.  
The elimination of the court decision granting permission after the children 
had been born was discussed at length. In one sense12, the decision of voluntary 
jurisdiction that granted permission can indeed be revoked following an appeal 
but the outcomes cannot be reversed, on the grounds of provision 779 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure which stipulates that “if the validity of a decision is reversed, 
modified, eliminated or suspended, the bona fide disbursements made by the 
obligee or a third party are strong and the rights gained are not to be encroached 
on and the same applies to the legal acts made by third parties acting in good faith 
based on the first decision, until the decision that revokes, modifies or eliinates 
the validity of the previous one comes into effect “. Expanding teleologically the 
scope of application of provision 779 of the CCP (: which is a provision of 
substantive law and explicitly mentions only outcomes relevant to property) we 
are thereby protecting the children born while the voluntary jurisdiction decision 
                                                          
8 Legal Council of State 261/2010 Efarmoges Astikou Dikeou 2010, 1205 et seq., by 
Papadopoulou- Klamari. 
9 Athens One-member CoFI 431/2013 Nomiko Vima Hellenic Law Review 62 (2014) 880, 
commentary by Nikolopoulos. 
10 Athens CoA 3357/2010 Annals of Private Law 2013, 508 
11 CoA Decision, Annals of Private Law 2013, 509.  
12 Papadopoulou-Klamari, Annals of Private Law 2013, 549. 
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was still valid. Opting for this solution would mean that the children would not in 
fact have a mother but they would have a father (the single man). According to a 
second point of view13 it would be enough to have recourse to a text overriding 
legislative power (ECHR article 8) to establish a rule dictating that despite the 
revocation of the decision the kinship of the children will remain unchanged. 
According to this second viewpoint the CCP 779 provision can also be used. 
Professor Kounougeri-Manoledaki wondered in the journal “Medical Law 
and Bioethics”14, whether Society is actually ready to accept an extended 
application of the CC 1458 to proportionately include single men (so that they too 
can have children through the method of gestational surrogacy). I suppose that 
most people would share her doubt, irrespective of whether they are in favour of 
the first or the second interpretation of the law. However, beyond that, allow me 
to add that in our legal system there is no known form of parenthood that excludes 
from the beginning, but also definitively, the establishment of motherhood as it so 
happens in France for instance. 
According to our law a child may have an unknown mother or may have a 
non-established father but may establish paternity during his/her life. However, if 
we were to accept the use of a surrogate mother by a single man, the children to 
be born will always be deprived of their connection to a mother. Such an 
eventuality (children who would not have a mother at the time of birth in the eyes 
of the law and would not be able to have a mother ad infinitum, since our system 
does not provide for any way other than labour and the court decision to use a 
surrogate) is not acknowledged in accordance with our law. Could it be then that 
the principle of equality, invoked by proponents of the extended use of surrogacy 
for single males, would actually result in the offense against the family life of a 
child that will be born with no established motherhood at birth and with no 
possibility whatsoever to have a mother relationship established during their 
lives? 
ΙΙΙ. Given the opportunity of the conference I would like to present to you some 
figures which regard artificial fertilization with the use of a surrogate mother. A 
study carried out by P. Ravdas has been published in the Volume on family law in 
                                                          
13 Koumoutzis, Annals of Private Law 2013, 552. 
14 Journal “Medical Law and Bioethics” Aug- Sept 2013, 23. 
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the 20th century.  
Today I would like to present to you a statistical study carried out for 5 years by a 
post-graduate student who was also a district judge at the time. The study in 
question was her master thesis supervised by my colleague Mrs Dakorona and 
myself. The questionnaire was prepared by the above post-graduate student under 
my supervision. The master thesis of Mrs Kokkinaki was submitted to the 
University Faculty15 on 5.2.2011. 
All decisions made by the Athens Court of First Instance granting permission for 
the use of a surrogate mother provided for by Laws 3089/2002 and 3305/2005 in 
the five year period (2005-2009)were included in the study. 
The study comprised a total number of 71 court decisions (2005: 14 decisions, 
2006-14 decisions, 2007 – 17 decisions, 2008- 15 decisions and 2009 eleven 
decisions)16. 
In terms of procedure it is quite interesting that approximately half of the cases 
were heard behind closed doors. The study also comprised all relevant decisions 
made by the Piraeus CoFI in the years 2007-2012, a total of 19 cases. 
In what concerns the women that made the petition: 
Most of them (65/71 + 15/19) were married and in fact had been for several years 
(one had been married for 33 years) 1/71 divorced, 1/19 unmarried, 1/19 lived 
with a partner in registered partnership while the rest just lived with their partners 
without such a registered cohabitation agreement (3/71 + 2/19). The 
overwhelming majority were 41-45 years old (17/71 + 5/19). However there were 
court decisions in which age is not stated (11/71) while one petition was rejected 
because the petitioner was 50 years old. 
Medical necessity was certified in court through a medical certificate. The 
diseases mentioned were mainly of a gynaecological nature but also other 
aetiologies (renal and heart failure, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, lung diseases, 
aneurysm, anorexia nervosa, prior radiation treatment, adenosarcoma) while there 
existed three women who had undergone kidney transplantation- one of them both 
                                                          
15 Kokkinaki, Master Thesis, School of Law, registered in the School electronic Archive of post-
graduate theses, 15.2.2011. 
16 The following fractions whose denominator is 71 allude to figures from the thesis of Mrs 
Kokkinaki and the fractions whose denominator is 19 concern figures of the Piraeus Court of First 
Instance. 
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kidney and pancreas- and one other had been subjected to a heart transplantation.  
However, many decisions mention as grounds for medical necessity 
spontaneous miscarriages, numerous failed IVF efforts (in fact there were cases of 
33, 12 and 14 IVF cycles mentioned in three of the women in their efforts to have 
a child). Some petitions regarded the bearing of a second child (3/71) and in one 
of these cases the first child had died. 
Do prior failed attempts to have a child constitute grounds for medical 
necessity, one wonders. On the other hand I find this reason sincere since it could 
easily have been replaced by another, false but plausible cause. 
Such issues can be discussed by the MAR competent Authority. 
In what concerns the candidate gestational surrogate: 
The overwhelming majority 39/71 and 9/19 were married women. 
2 widows (2/71), (23/71 and 7/19) were single, out of whom 3 already had 2 
children and one had 1 child. One was divorced with 3 children. 
While many of them had already become mothers (33/71 and 8/19) of 2 (12/71 
and 3/19), 3 (3/71 and 10/19) and 4 children (2/71 and 
 1/19) respectively. 
The age of the surrogate was mainly 31-40 years old (19/71 and 10/19) while 
some women were far older (52 and 57 years old) and there also existed a very 
young one (18 years old). 
Quite a few were Greek 29/71 and 4/19 but most of them were aliens of different 
nationalities: Albanian (6/71 and 3/19) Bulgarian (2/71 and 1/19) Moldovan 
(1/71) Romanian (5/71) French (1/71) British (3/71) Russian(3/71) Ukrainian 
(1/71) Georgian (3/71 and 4/19) Polish (4/19) Brazilian (1/71) Armenian (1/71) 
and American (1/71).  
Special emphasis is placed on the physical and mental health of the surrogate 
mother as well as her suitability, attested through medical certificates. 
Concerning the relationship between the gestational carrier and the social mother 
roughly speaking:  
 20/71 women were related by blood 
2 were related by marriage (the gestational carrier was the husband’s sister) 
 6/71 and 2/19 were sisters 
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 6/71 were mothers of the women 
 22/71 and 9/19 were friends of the couple, 14/71 and 6/19 were professional 
acquaintances (usually housemaids, nurses catering for the parents of the couple 
that wanted a child, in fact in one case the unmarried housemaid already had a 
child and was nursing the very old mother of the applicant at the time. The 
decision mentioned that the young woman would in fact continue to work during 
pregnancy and after the birth of the child)! 
25/71 applicants had furnished a private agreement document; 14/71 
submitted a document authenticated by a notary and 22/71 furnished a document 
drawn up by a notary public. 
In one case the agreement stipulated that the gestational carrier was to be 
accommodated in the residence of the candidate social parents throughout the 
gestational period. 
Many decisions include references about the good financial situation of the 
candidate social mother, the harmonious relations between the candidate social 
parents and their income bracket.  
Finally in 47/ 71 and 9/19 cases it was explicitly mentioned that the ova 
would be donated by the candidate social mother herself and in the rest of the 
cases by other donors.  
In what concerns the study, it would be advantageous to have it continued, 
especially in large and perhaps middle-size courts of first instance definitely in 
Athens and Thessaloniki and, since we have data for the period spanning 2005-
2009, it would be opportune to study the next 5 years. 
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